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I. INTRODUCTION 
During the sixties, social critics visited institutions for the retarded and were 
shocked by the conditions they found (Blatt and Kaplan 1966; Rivera 1972). Schol- 
arly research supported the conclusions of lay observers (see the studies cited in 
Balla, Butterfield, and Zigler [1974] and Biklen [1979]). Consensus was easy: peo- 
ple saw conditions that everyone believed were bad, and all agreed that policies 
should change. Only a small percentage of the retarded were in institutions or 
helped by specialized public programs, and many had been excluded from school. 
Care was inadequate both because it was of low quality and because many of the 
retarded received no services. Social critics were allied not only with scholarly 
experts but with many who had a deep personal interest in programs for the 
retarded. Both parents and professionals who cared for the retarded sought changes 
in treatment and educational methods and increases in public funding.' The key 
slogans were deinstitutionalization, normalization, mainstreaming, and a devel- 
opmental model of care.2 
* Partially funded by the Yale Program on Non-Profit Organizations. I wish to thank 
Anita Miller for originally interesting me in this topic, Bruce Ackerman for helping me 
think through the philosophical alternatives, and Marc Chupka for very able research assis- 
tance. I benefited from presenting the paper at the Regulation Seminar of the Yale Center for 
Health Studies in the Institution for Social and Policy Studies. 
1. See, e.g., National Association for Retarded Children Five-Year Plan, Document B, 
"Service Goals and Achievement Strategies" reprinted in U.S. President's Committee on 
Mental Retardation (1977), pp. 59-61, hereafter cited as PCMR. 
2. Several writers have tried to define these terms. The National Association of Super- 
intendents of Public Residential Facilities for the Mentally Retarded claims that: "Deinstitu- 
tionalization encompasses three interrelated processes: (1) prevention of admission by find- 
ing and developing alternative community methods of care and training; (2) return to the 
community of all residents who have been prepared through programs of habilitation and 
training to function adequately in appropriate local settings; and (3) establishment and 
maintenance of a responsive residential environment which protects human and civil rights 
and which contributes to the expeditious return of the individual to normal community 
living, whenever possible" (quoted in Scheerenberger 1977, p. 3). An influential statement of 
the normalization principle was made by Nirje (1976) in an article first published in 1969. 
He states that the normalization principle "means making available to all mentally retarded 
people patterns of life and conditions of everyday living which are as close as possible to the 
regular circumstances and ways of life of society" (p. 231). See also Jones et al. (1975, p. 4) 
and Wolfensberger (1976). Mainstreaming, according to Wiegerink and Posante-Lobo (1977, 
p. 71), "means integration of exceptional children into the common flow of the educational 
system. It seeks an end to segregated special classrooms for the special children and a 
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This consensus is now falling apart. As shock and outrage are translated into 
particular programmatic changes, public policy toward the retarded has once 
again become a difficult and controversial issue. The retarded, their parents, and 
their professional advocates are only a small minority of the population. The 
severely and profoundly retarded are an even smaller group.3 To change policy, 
the minority must generate support from the general public. Sympathy, however, 
is easier to obtain than tax dollars and private monetary donations. This places 
activists for the mentally retarded in a difficult position. A clear, simple message is 
easier to use as a rallying cry than a balanced and complicated assessment of the 
relative merits of alternative policies. The principles of normalization and deinsti- 
tutionalization would, however, be expensive if consistently translated into poli- 
cy. Even the most impassioned advocates may be forced to lay aside principle in 
the competition for funds. Under the pressure of scarce resources, cracks appear in 
the alliance of legal activists, mental retardation professionals, and parents (cf. 
Roos 1979). The tensions not only represent clashes between private interests and 
moral principles but also reveal fundamental philosophical disagreements. The 
debate, however, has seldom moved behind the slogans to examine the underlying 
premises of the normalization movement. 
The examination of premises is not an easy task since the advocates them- 
selves are not particularly concerned with consistency. Therefore, Section II of this 
paper begins with philosophy and asks how several general normative political 
theories would deal with the mentally retarded. I show that some common norma- 
tive positions that are perfectly serviceable in most contexts are incoherent when 
applied to mental retardation, but that other classes of theories do generate inter- 
nally consistent views. Section III, then, discusses the relationship between these 
theories and the positions of advocates and illustrates the way principles conflict 
with each other under plausible interpretations of the facts. Section IV explores 
the links between private interests and philosophical principles and explains why 
beginning of provision for their special needs in the regular classroom." The developmental 
model is presented as a contrast to a "medical" model that views retardation as an incurable 
medical problem (Wolfensberger 1976, pp. 38-39). Wolfensberger (1976, p. 44) characterizes 
the developmental model as one that takes "an optimistic view of the modifiability of 
behavior, and usually it does not invest the differentness of the retarded person with strong 
negative value. Even if severely retarded, he is perceived as capable of growth, development, 
and learning." 
3. The American Association on Mental Deficiency (AAMD) defines mental retarda- 
tion as "substantially subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with 
deficits in adaptive behavior, and manifested during the developmental period" (quoted in 
Brewer and Kakalik 1979, p. 88). "Subaverage" means an IQ of at least two standard devia- 
tions below the mean (about 70 or below). Thus, if intelligence is, in fact, normally distrib- 
uted, this implies that 2.3 percent of the population is retarded (or 4.67 million people in 
1970). The National Association for Retarded Citizens (NARC), however, uses a rate of 3 
percent (6.1 million people in 1970). The severely and profoundly retarded population is 
estimated by NARC to be about 5 percent of the total number of retarded persons or 0.15 
percent of the population. Severe retardation is defined by the AAMD as an IQ between 20 
and 35. The profoundly retarded have IQs of less than 20 (Brewer and Kakalik 1979, pp. 
89-90). Many researchers recognize, however, that IQ tests are an inadequate guide in many 
cases. They turn instead to a developmental definition-e.g., children "with a major deficit 
in more than one of the basic developmental areas of language, self-help skills, motor skills, 
or socialization and who require extensive structure for learning to occur" (Fredericks et al. 
1978, p. 192). 
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some past alliances are breaking up. Section V considers the way the advocates of 
normalization have been forced to compromise their principles to obtain funds 
and points to the range of hard choices confronting both politicians and advocates 
for the retarded. Thus, Sections II and III show that basic principles matter in the 
sense that they have different policy implications. Sections IV and V go on to show 
that ideas are not the only things that matter in a realistic political setting (cf. 
Roos 1979; Conley 1973, chap. 7). 
II. NORMATIVE PRINCIPLES 
A. Choice-based Theories 
Two kinds of philosophical position cannot satisfactorily deal with mental retar- 
dation. I shall call these the choice-based and class-based approaches. The most 
familiar example of a choice-based theory seeks to maximize the dollar value of 
producers' and consumers' surplus. Net benefits are calculated by asking people to 
specify either how much they would pay to obtain a benefit or how much they 
must be paid to accept a loss (for a standard treatment, see Baumol [1977, pp. 
496-500]). The main difficulty is the design, even in principle, of the required 
thought experiments. Suppose, for example, that we are considering the provision 
of services to the severely mentally retarded. For some level of transfer, all people 
may be made better off. The program is Pareto preferred to the status quo since 
those of normal intelligence sympathize with the retarded and are willing to be 
taxed to help them (Hochman and Rodgers 1969). At some point, however, this 
ceases to be true. How then do surplus maximizers proceed? How are they to 
measure the gainers' willingness to pay? The thought experiments may be beyond 
the capacity of the severely retarded. Even when provided with measuring rods 
commensurate with their experience, one might be unable to communicate the 
rather complex notion of compensation: for example, How many tokens or ciga- 
rettes would you give up in return for learning to dress yourself or eat with a fork?4 
In contrast, most mildly retarded individuals can be taught to make independent 
choices (Edgerton 1967; Baker, Seltzer, and Seltzer 1974; Kennedy 1966). Therefore, 
for these people, education may be designed with this goal in mind. It does not 
seem possible, however, to use a choice-based methodology to measure the benefits 
of this kind of education. Asking people to choose the value of learning to choose 
is incoherent. Asking people who have learned to make choices how much this 
education is worth is almost as difficult to fathom. A person is not obviously the 
same choosing entity both ex ante and ex post.5 
One method of carrying out the thought experiments needed to assess benefits 
is particularly unsatisfactory. Some analysts have suggested that we compare the 
gains and losses of various actors by "putting ourselves in the other person's 
4. Abstract thinking is beyond the capabilities of many retarded people, especially 
those at the low end of the distribution of intelligence. Many people who are severely and 
profoundly retarded can be taught some basic skills. Teaching methods for both children 
and adults, however, generally involve breaking a task down into a series of small pieces, 
with constant repetition, and immediate reinforcement of good performance with praise, 
gold stars, or tangible rewards like cigarettes ot candy. Thus, the retarded are rewarded for 
learning, not given the choice of smoking a pack of cigarettes a day or learning to take a 
shower on their own. (See Matson, Marchetti, and Adkins 1980; Sanders 1975; Yates 1970.) 
5. The problem is similar to the difficulties that arise in attempts to value life (see 
Broome [1978] and comments by Buchanan and Faith [1979], Broome [1979], Jones-Lee 
[1979], and Williams [1979]). 
84 Ethics October 1982 
place" (see Suppes [1966] and Sen's critique [1970, pp. 146-50]). On the one hand, 
our imaginative powers are not well developed enough to permit us to assert with 
any confidence that we can understand the benefits to a severely retarded person of 
learning to dress himself. On the other hand, it seems to be a contradiction in 
terms to imagine that a retarded person can put himself in the place of those of 
normal intelligence to assess the value of programs designed to develop IQ. 
Of course, the less seriously retarded a person is, the more operational are 
standard cost-benefit techniques that rely on hypothetical choices. A job training 
program may succeed in raising a person's earning capacity. These benefits can 
then be compared fairly easily with training costs. The benefits to the person of 
self-sufficiency and integration into the larger society are difficult to measure, but 
some of the gains are captured by measuring earnings (see Conley [1973, pp. 
287-300], who reports very high benefit-cost ratios for vocational training and 
education). 
B. Class-based Theories 
The second type of theory groups people into broad classes and discusses distribu- 
tive justice only with respect to these classes. In such theories, the definition of a 
class is of central importance. Thus, John Rawls (1971) argues that justice re- 
quires that society maximize the position of the "worst-off class." Rawls (1979, p. 
11) disclaims any attempt to deal with the handicapped, and it is not hard to see 
why they create problems. If the worst-off class includes only the severely handi- 
capped and the terminally ill, then the rest of Rawls's argument implies a massive 
redistribution to them. Alternatively, if the worst-off class includes the bulk of the 
poor and working-class population, then the handicapped become a trivial mi- 
nority who may actually be worse off in the Rawlsian world than in a utilitarian 
one. (See Ackerman [1980, pp. 266-72] for a fuller critique of Rawls on these 
grounds.) 
Karl Marx provides another familiar class-based theory. Marx concentrates on 
the exploitation of the working class and has relatively little to say about people of 
genuinely low productivity (Robinson 1966, p. 12, n. 2). In the transitional stage 
of socialism, people would earn different amounts depending upon their abilities. 
Under communism, however, a person's "needs and desires, rather than his con- 
tribution of labor, will be the basis for the distribution of goods" (Lakoff 1964, pp. 
223-24). Thus, the unproductive would presumably benefit in the final stage of 
communism, but Marx provides no discussion of how much redistribution would 
be justified. Before this final stage is reached, Marxism has very much the same 
implications as Rawls's work for policy toward the retarded and handicapped: 
they are submerged in the proletariat and get no special treatment. 
C. Respect-based Theories 
A class of philosophical work stresses each individual's right to equal respect as a 
person. To understand this position, one must explain who is to be counted as a 
"person" and what is meant by "equal" and by "respect." Some people draw a 
sharp line between the biologically human and other animals. This sharp line has 
been "justified" theologically by claiming that biologically human beings are 
made in the image of God (Allen and Allen 1979, pp. 139-40). But for the more 
secularly inclined, it seems difficult to make a biological distinction in a prin- 
cipled way. Singer (1976) calls the attempt "speciesism" and properly analogizes it 
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to racism. Instead of emphasizing biological characteristics, some philosophers 
stress the capacity for rational discussion (Ackerman 1980) or the ability to make 
autonomous choices as the characteristic that justifies respect. (Thus, Kant [1976] 
uses the term "self-consciousness" to distinguish humans from animals.) If one's 
standards are not too high, then a large proportion of those classified as moderate- 
ly and mildly retarded could probably pass a minimal autonomy or rationality 
test. Most can master daily living skills with only somewhat more difficutly than 
other people, and many people classified as retarded by school authorities live 
"normal" adult lives (Edgerton 1967; Kennedy 1966). Yet, even under a minimal 
test, most of the severely and profoundly retarded and perhaps some in the moder- 
ate and mild categories would have no "right" to equal respect. (Cf. Montague 
[1980, p. 384]; Regan [1980, p. 321] conjectures that Kant would include severely 
retarded humans in the unselfconscious group.) Respect-based theories thus have 
little to say about how society should treat those who are not entitled to equal 
respect. One might simply apply different theories to each group. See, for exam- 
ple, Nozick's discussion (1974, pp. 39-47) of "Kantianism for people, Utilitarian- 
ism for animals." (Nozick, however, avoids any discussion of defective members of 
a species [p. 45n.].) 
Having defined the relevant class, one must still explain how to give each 
person "equal respect." At least two quite different interpretations can be given. 
The first approach emphasizes formal legal equality. Everyone who is labeled a 
"person" is entitled to the same set of legal rights, and no one can claim special 
rights on the basis of his or her mental capacities. Just as the genius cannot insist 
on privileges, neither can the mentally retarded person demand special benefits. On 
this theory, retarded persons can marry, vote, have children, sign contracts, etc. 
They can live, work, and spend their leisure time wherever they choose, subject 
only to the constraints of talent and income. This formal equality, however, may 
lead some mildly retarded people to fail in especially obvious ways, so that they 
live in poverty and loneliness and do not view themselves as people with substan- 
tial control over their own lives. They have the same "right to fail" as anyone else, 
but they may exercise this right with greater frequency than other people. 
In contrast, the second approach to equal respect is concerned with "effective 
autonomy." It seeks to avoid situations where people feel that they have no per- 
sonal control over their lives. Using this second criterion, policies should be 
designed to encourage retarded people to make rational choices in some areas of 
their lives even though many of them would be unable to live successfully on their 
own. Thus, the effective autonomy of moderately retarded people might be en- 
hanced by a life which permits choices to be made in a controlled environment 
where serious failure, embarrassment, and shame are prevented. Policies to en- 
courage sheltered work and recreation might be recommended, or even the place- 
ment of some retarded people in a setting like one of the Camphill sheltered 
villages where choice is encouraged in an isolated community protected from 
many of the pressures of the larger society (Baker, Seltzer, and Seltzer 1974). 
6. Some mildly retarded people, however, do need training to improve their personal 
appearance and to control behavior that would interfere with employment (Sanders 1975, 
pp. 38-80). The management of money presents particular difficulties (Schalock and Harper 
1978). Edgerton (1967) and Baker, Seltzer, and Seltzer (1974) stress the importance of both 
emotional stability and training for independent living. 
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D. Happiness-based Theories 
A final group of theories concentrates not on respect but on happiness. Although 
happiness is never easy to measure in a meaningful way, one need not depend on 
the methodology of choice-based theories. While a choice-based test requires a 
person to conceive of well-specified hypothetical alternatives, a happiness-based 
theory does not require the person himself to carry out such thought experiments. 
Even though it makes no sense to ask profoundly or severely retarded people how 
much they would choose to pay to receive a benefit, it nevertheless may be possible 
to decide whether they would be happier if they could dress themselves or drink 
from a cup. If one can meaningfully assess the happiness of a dog or an infant, 
there does not seem to be any special conceptual difficulty in assessing the happi- 
ness of the retarded. 
I shall distinguish two different happiness-based theories: utilitarianism adds 
satisfaction levels together and tries to maximize the total,7 egalitarianism seeks to 
make all people equally happy.8 
A consistent utilitarian position would take account of the happiness of all 
sentient beings (Bentham 1976; Mill 1976; Singer 1976). Thus, Bentham argues 
that animals should be included in the felicific calculus because of their capacity 
for suffering. To exclude either animals or severely and profoundly retarded peo- 
ple, the utilitarian would have to introduce some other principle besides "happi- 
ness" or else make the empirical claim that these beings cannot experience plea- 
sure or pain. 
To maximize the total utility of a given group of sentient beings, one seeks to 
find the point where the marginal utility of extra resources is equal for all entities. 
Thus, utilitarians are not interested in compensating a retarded person to make 
up for his or her handicap. Instead, they want to know how much extra happiness 
the retarded person obtains from an extra input of resources. Since the "produc- 
tion function" for happiness is not well understood, the literature contains a 
number of conflicting guesses. Thus, utilitarians and their critics sometimes dis- 
agree on the marginal utility of income to the handicapped. Lerner (1944, p. 40) 
states that his utilitarian argument in favor of equality "does not rule out particu- 
lar cases where some reason may be given for particularly high or particularly low 
needs, for instance, of invalids on the one hand or ascetics on the other." Sen 
(1973, pp. 16-18), in contrast, claims that a utilitarian would favor normal people 
over cripples on the ground that cripples have a lower marginal utility of income 
at each income level. Conley (1973, p. 162) states: "Mental retardation will reduce 
a person's ability to enjoy leisure in the same way that it reduces a person's ability 
to earn in paid employment," but he does not offer any evidence. Nevertheless, it is 
7. Utilitarianism has frequently been described as seeking "the greatest happiness for 
the greatest number." The meaning of this statement is unclear, however, since it does not 
specify whether per capita or total happiness is to be maximized. Clearly, if one is concerned 
with issues of birth control, abortion, and population policy, these two criteria yield very 
different results. The issue arises in the discussions of mental retardation when parents must 
decide whether to abort a defective child or withhold medical care from a severely handi- 
capped newborn (Allen and Allen 1979, pp. 30-62). Since I do not deal with these issues here, 
I can take the population as fixed. In that case maximizing total happiness is identical with 
maximizing average happiness. 
8. This is not, of course, the only meaning of egalitarianism, but it is the only one 
discussed here. See Lakoff (1964) and Rae (1979) for attempts to sort out the different mean- 
ings of this term. 
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at least possible that marginal gains in the happiness of the retarded have high 
opportunity costs. Thus, a utilitarian might well conclude that large subsidies to 
the retarded are not justified. 
Egalitarians, seeking to equalize satisfaction levels, are also not necessarily 
committed to large-scale transfers to the retarded. It is by no means obvious that 
there is a strong positive correlation between intelligence and happiness. If, in 
fact, a small quantity of material resources will make the retarded relatively happy 
with their lives,9 then an egalitarian will oppose expensive programs. 
III. FROM PHILOSOPHY TO ADVOCACY 
A. A False Consensus 
Respect-based and happiness-based theories provide consistent positions from 
which to assess policy toward the mentally retarded. Each has its own hard cases 
and difficult line-drawing problems, but each can provide a framework for analy- 
sis. Most advocates for the retarded cannot, however, be associated clearly with any 
of these philosophical positions. Although many make arguments based on 
"moral" principles, they have seldom worked out the implications of their beliefs. 
In particular, there is a basic tension between advocates for the retarded and 
others with a more general concern for social justice. Advocates tend to ignore the 
costs imposed on those who are not retarded. In contrast, people with more gener- 
al concerns consider the entire population. Thus, a thoroughgoing "rights the- 
ory" must come to terms with the possibility that it may be impossible to "give 
everyone their rights" simultaneously, and a happiness-based theory must com- 
pare the utilities of all individuals. Any general theory that recognizes the scarcity 
of resources and takes account of the interests of all people is likely to conflict with 
the positions advanced by advocates for the retarded. 
To avoid this confrontation, advocates often claim that community-based 
care and mainstream education are both cheaper and more effective than alterna- 
tive policies (Center on Human Policy 1979). It is, however, by no means obvious 
that this is so. Although some research purports to have generated this result, it is 
of questionable quality.'0 In particular, some cost studies have failed to recognize 
that, if more community-based facilities are made available, then more of the 
retarded may demand services. According to Conley (1973), only 5 percent of the 
9. Gibbons and Gibbons (1980, pp. 602-4) review evidence on the self-concept of 
retarded children. One study (Fine and Caldwell 1967) found that educable mentally retarded 
(EMR) children often have very positive self-concepts which researchers dubbed "inaccurate, 
inflated and unrealistic." The U.S. Department of Labor (1979, p. A-121, table 23B) inter- 
viewed sheltered workshop clients in 1976 and found that the mentally retarded were gener- 
ally satisfied. However, other research shows that many of the retarded are lonely, frustrated, 
and unhappy (Edgerton 1967; Baker, Seltzer, and Seltzer 1974). Evidence from the studies 
cited in Gibbons and Gibbons (1980) is mixed, and it is not clear whether those who are 
unhappy feel bad because they are retarded or because they have been poorly cared for. 
10. These studies frequently overstate the net benefits of community-based care by 
failing to consider fixed costs appropriately and by neglecting to measure the costs of many 
of the services used by those in community-based facilities. The studies also do not measure 
how different types of retarded individuals would benefit from different types of programs, 
and they fail to consider the costs of monitoring a decentralized system. For critical reviews 
of the recent literature, see Heal, Siegelman, and Switzky (1978) and Wieck (1980, pp. 20-56). 
See Bradley (1978) for an attempt to alert policymakers to the hidden costs of deinstitution- 
alization. 
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retarded are in residential institutions (over 50 percent of the severely and pro- 
foundly retarded). A program that is more attractive to the parents of mentally 
retarded youth and to mildly and moderately retarded adults than current pro- 
grams can be very expensive for taxpayers if it is made available to all who 
demand service. If community-based care were one-fourth as costly as institutional 
care but led to the participation of 30 percent of the retarded, total budgetary costs 
would increase by 50 percent. These costs, however, must be balanced against the 
benefits to the retarded people and to their parents. It may be that the change in 
policy is justified on straight utilitarian grounds once the benefits to both the 
retarded people and their parents are calculated, but this is an empirical claim that 
would have to be demonstrated. 
Advocates not only try to deny conflicts between their positions and more 
general political philosophies, but also seem to hold several potentially conflict- 
ing views simultaneously. The most common position is a hodgepodge of respect- 
based and happiness-based theories, along with some unsupported empirical 
claims. Thus, many legal activists who have argued court cases or lobbied for 
changes in laws emphasize formal legal equality at the same time that they call for 
large earmarked subsidies. The subsidies are to be used for programs that make the 
mentally retarded happy at the same time that they increase their capacity for 
autonomous choice. Much of the rhetoric implies that happiness-based and re- 
spect-based theories are compatible. Advocates argue that the problem of adjust- 
ment to independent living or to a regular school class is balanced by the individ- 
ual's long-run gain in satisfaction with his or her life (e.g., Bronston 1976; Nirje 
1976). This is, however, an empirical proposition that might or might not be true. 
Apparently, most of the retarded who live independently are fairly poor unless 
they have managed to marry a person of normal intelligence (Edgerton 1967; 
Kennedy 1966; PCMR 1977, p. 165). This is not surprising, but it does make clear 
that retarded people living in the community are unlikely to attain the average 
standard of living. If happiness is correlated with income, the retarded are unlike- 
ly to be very happy." 
Therefore, a potential for conflict exists, since some advocates see happiness 
as a means to the end of autonomy while others see autonomy as a means to the 
end of happiness. This tension is well illustrated by a 1978 court hearing concern- 
ing the implementation of a famous right-to-treatment case (Wyatt v. Stickney 344 
F. Supp. 387 [M.D.Ala. 1972]). Professionals disagreed on whether deinstitutional- 
ization was always to be preferred to high-quality institutional programs. Some 
stressed the need to push training for autonomous daily living as far as possible, 
while others pointed to the low marginal benefits relative to the costs and favored 
giving the mentally retarded pleasurable experiences (Rosenberg and Friedman 
1979). 
B. Rights and "Normalization" 
Rather than confronting the inconsistencies in their positions directly, advocates 
have tended to assert a list of rights that ought to be guaranteed to the retarded. In 
many cases, however, it is difficult to identify the principle underlying the list, and 
11. Cf. Roos 1979, pp. 616-17. For some empirical support for these concerns, see Baker, 
Seltzer, and Seltzer (1974), Budoff and Gottlieb (1976), Edgerton (1967), and O'Donnell and 
Bradfield (1976). Wolfensberger (1976, p. 52) quotes Governor Butler of Massachusetts who 
in the 1880s said: "A well-fed, well-cared for idiot is a happy creature. An idiot awakened to 
his condition is a miserable one." 
Rose-Ackerman Survey Article 89 
many rights would conflict with each other if systematically applied. The stan- 
dard compilation includes the right to adequate income and employment, the 
right to live in the community, the right to habilitation, and the right to the "least 
restrictive" alternative (see, e.g., Schoenfeld 1974; the United Nations Declaration 
of the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons, 1971 [reproduced in Allen and Allen 
1979]; and "Rights of MR Persons: An Official Statement of the American Associa- 
tion on Mental Deficiency" [reproduced in Friedman 1976, pp. 179-86]). The list 
has been extended by some to include the right to be loved, the right to ignore 
gratuitous advice, and the right to happiness (e.g., Bronston 1976, p. 492; Wald 
1976, pp. 5-17). 
Some rights are especially difficult to defend because it is not clear that the 
rest of the population can assert these rights, however much they might like to do 
so. For example, in a speech in 1950 to the National Association for Retarded 
Citizens, one speaker asserted that retarded children have the "same right to happi- 
ness" as children everywhere (quoted in PCMR 1977, p. 40). Since most people, 
children as well as adults, are unhappy at least some of the time, it appears that 
few children are guaranteed this "right." In fact, although the right to the pursuit 
of happiness is frequently asserted, the right actually to attain happiness is seldom 
claimed by the general population. Furthermore, it is not obvious how society 
could make such a right operational, even if it were accepted. 
These lists of rights are difficult to defend because advocates seldom take the 
first step of explaining why the mentally retarded are entitled to rights. While 
advocates assert that the retarded are entitled to respect, they consistently reject the 
idea that the mentally retarded must be capable of autonomous choice or rational 
discussion before they qualify (e.g., Feldman 1979; Gilhool 1976). Although it is 
seldom openly discussed, their position seems based on a latent speciesism which 
claims that all biological humans have certain rights. These rights do not appear 
to apply to dolphins and chimpanzees, but we are left to wonder why. (Cf. Regan 
[1980], who argues for animal rights by pointing to the rights granted to the 
mentally retarded.) 
One group of advocates concentrates on formal legal equality. Using the 
analogy of racial and sexual prejudice (Gilhool 1976, p. 174), they are especially 
concerned with the pernicious effects of labeling. Those who emphasize formal 
equality have opposed special education for retarded children and special pro- 
grams for retarded prisoners. These advocates frequently try to justify their posi- 
tion by pointing to the ineffectiveness of special programs (e.g., see Schwartz's 
[1976] response to Rowan [1976]). There is little attempt to deal directly with the 
tension between formal equality and effective autonomy. 
The attempt to treat every biological human being with formal equality is 
especially difficult to sustain for those who are severely and profoundly retarded or 
who have multiple handicaps. These people will almost always be labeled since 
most of them cannot function normally in mainstream society. They pose a di- 
lemma for those who support formal equality. A strict application of their princi- 
ple would deny specialized services to severely and profoundly retarded people. 
Therefore, few advocates actually consistently espouse formal equality as the ex- 
clusive operative principle (Wald [1976] comes closest), asserting the argument 
only to gain benefits like the rights to vote, have children, and sign contracts. 
A more common standard is the "normalization" principle which states that 
the retarded have the right to a range of goods and services that make their lives as 
"normal" as possible (Nirje 1976). The particular entitlements one espouses ob- 
90 Ethics October 1982 
viously depend upon one's definition of "normal" life. In practice, the emphasis 
has been on housing, schooling, work, friendship, and family life. Thus, the right 
to a normal life may imply policies which generate the respect of others, with no 
necessary tie to the choices made by the retarded themselves. The normalization 
principle may lead to policies that place the retarded in life situations that are 
close to those chosen by many normal people. Under this approach, individuals 
are not always given the right to live according to their own distinctive views of 
the good life. If some of the retarded feel oppressed when forced to normalize by 
settling down in a middle-class neighborhood and taking a regular job, then this 
kind of normalization is not consistent with autonomy. The possible conflict 
between this version of the normalization principle and a philosophy based on the 
development of autonomy depends upon the capacities of the particular mentally 
retarded person and on the way normalization is translated into specific policies. 
Consider, first, the severely and profoundly retarded. For them, normalization 
has been taken to mean efforts to teach the rudiments of independent daily living 
(Yates 1970, pp. 332-34). This kind of training is difficult to interpret as the 
imposition of middle-class values. Even members of the radical fringe and the 
fascist party know how to dress themselves, speak and understand language, and 
drink from a cup. However, the principle has also been associated with the devel- 
opment of residential facilities with as few clients as possible (Ferleger and Boyd 
1979). Here the conflict between the symbols of normal life and reality may be 
stark. Small residences with half a dozen clients may be unable to provide special- 
ized care and could isolate the severely retarded person more fully than life in a 
larger institution (for evidence on the tenuous link between size and "quality," see 
Landesman-Dwyer and Sackett [1980]). 
For the moderately and mildly retarded, the tension between normalization 
and autonomous choice is even more obvious. An advocate concerned with giving 
the retarded a normal life may find that this conflicts with policies that develop 
self-respect and autonomy. For example, if permitted to speak for themselves some 
retarded adults might well argue against deinstitutionalization and normalization 
and in favor of protective institutional care (Roos 1979, p. 617). Retarded children 
might find that mainstreaming in the educational system makes learning difficult. 
They might be better able to cope with the world as adults if they were initially 
segregated in special classes.'2 If this were true, then advocates of normalization 
would find themselves with an awkward decision-making problem. Their interest 
in helping the adult retarded person cope with life is in conflict with their belief 
that the educational system should be organized to avoid stigmatizing children. 
IV. ALLIANCES 
Although principle plays an especially critical role in shaping policy toward the 
retarded, private interests are also influential. Thus, it is important to see how 
different moral commitments support or oppose various private interests. This 
will help us to understand the present pattern of alliances. 
12. There is no clear evidence on this point because students differ and because the 
quality of both special education and mainstream education can vary widely. Several of the 
writers in O'Donnell and Bradfield (1976) point out the need to reorganize the entire educa- 
tional system, retrain teachers, and provide additional funds if mainstreaming is to succeed 
for both normal and handicapped children. See also Sarason and Doris (1979, pp. 393-412). 
Unfortunately, research on education in general is not much better than research on special 
education, so it is difficult to assess the impact of systematic changes (see Murnane 1980). 
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First, consider the parents of retarded children and adults. Their political 
interests and activism depend in large part on their socioeconomic status. Wealthy 
parents do not need to ally with anyone. They can simply send their children to 
expensive private residential schools.'3 Poor parents, especially those from minor- 
ity ethnic and racial groups with a high incidence of mild retardation,'4 face a 
special problem. Because of their poverty, they are likely to be less sympathetic to 
programs that favor the retarded over other poor people. Because of their minority 
group status, they will also wish to avoid programs that doubly label a person as 
both retarded and a member of a minority group. However, they would like to 
receive subsidies to supplement their meager incomes, and the general public may 
be more willing to aid the retarded than the poor. 
In the postwar period, white middle-class parents whose children are severely 
or profoundly retarded have formed the core of political activists. Lacking both 
the resources of the rich and concern with stigma of minority groups, they have 
organized into Associations for Retarded Children (now Citizens)-ARCs-at the 
local, state, and federal level.'5 In an alliance with legal activists, they have pushed 
for deinstitutionalization and normalization and for a developmental model of 
care. They have lobbied for high levels of public subsidy and for laws mandating 
equal or favored treatment for the retarded (PCMR 1977; Wiegerink and Posante- 
Lobo 1977). Although both ARC parents and legal activists favor large public 
subsidies and a reorganized system of care irrespective of the costs imposed on 
others, conflicts have now arisen in several areas. First, most legal activists use 
respect-based arguments that are not tied to a person's capacity for autonomous 
choice and that leave out of account the interests of parents and siblings. The 
burden on a retarded person's family is not a primary concern of those committed 
to the right of the retarded to lead normal lives. Thus, legal activists may push for 
more home-based care than parents want to accept (Roos 1979; Wald 1976, p. 16). 
Second, the funding priorities of the groups are different. Middle-class parents are 
likely to be less egalitarian than principled advocates. Parents may be especially 
interested in supporting programs that provide funds to organizations that they 
13. Conley (1973, p. 96) reports that in 1970 the direct annual accounting cost per 
patient of private residential facilities was $5,470 for residential care and $22,265 for private 
mental hospitals. 
14. Mild retardation, as measured by tests and by the assessments of parents and teach- 
ers, is associated both with low income and with ethnic group status. In an SRI Internation- 
al Education Policy Research Center study (1979), teachers identified 1.33 percent of the 
youths as needing special resources for the retarded but labeled as retarded 3 percent of those 
from families earning less than $5,000 per year and 0.15 percent from families earning more 
than $15,000. Similarly, IQ tests identified as retarded (IQ less than 69) 7.7 percent of the 
youths whose family income was below $3,000, 2.9 percent with family income between 
$3,000 and $5,000, and 0.15 percent of those from families earning over $15,000. The overall 
incidence using the IQ test was 2 percent (p. 35). Mercer (1973, pp. 78-79) shows that in one 
California city Mexican-Americans were much more likely to be judged as retarded than 
either blacks or Anglo-Americans. Correcting for socioeconomic conditions exacerbated the 
differences, suggesting that the difference was due to difficulties with the English language. 
Blacks also have a higher incidence of mental retardation on several measures (Mercer 1973, 
p. 78; SRI International Education Policy Research Center 1979, p. 35; Conley 1973, pp. 
18-40, 50-67). These differences may be mainly due to differences in socioeconomic condi- 
tions (Mercer 1973; Kamin 1974). 
15. A recent study showed that minorities, the very wealthy, and the very poor are not 
significantly represented in the NARC (cited in PCMR 1977, p. 39). 
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control, and they may resist pressures to admit more clients or to broaden the 
socioeconomic base of these organizations.'6 
A major source of disagreement over funding is the tension between those 
activists and parents who concentrate their efforts on the 5-6 percent of the re- 
tarded in the severe and profound category and activists and parents at all income 
levels whose main interest is the much larger number of mildly retarded or border- 
line people with one or another learning disability. Expensive training programs, 
humane living conditions, and prevention and early detection are the main con- 
cerns of the former group. Avoiding the stigma of labeling while still giving help 
is the concern of the latter. Those who want to concentrate on the severely and 
profoundly retarded are unlikely to make arguments that tie rights to the ability to 
make autonomous choices. In contrast, those whose chief concern is the mildly 
retarded are interested in programs that help them become integrated into the 
mainstream of society. Conflicts over principles can thus also become conflicts 
between the parents of children with different levels of retardation. 
Second, voters, homeowners, and officials in public and private agencies 
whose primary purpose is not aid to the mentally retarded population are likely to 
support aid to the retarded on one or another philosophic ground. But they are 
acutely aware of at least some opportunity costs. They may thus support a utilitar- 
ian, happiness-based position on some issues. However, just as the groups with a 
personal interest in favoring the retarded give benefits a high weight and costs a 
low weight, other groups attach high weight to the costs imposed on them relative 
to the benefits gained by the retarded. Compared with disinterested utilitarian 
analysts, they are likely to support lower levels of subsidy and different kinds of 
aid. Taxpayers will be especially concerned with the question of coverage. They 
will be unimpressed with research which shows that community-based care is 
cheaper than institutional care on an individual-by-individual basis and may 
oppose a deinstitutionalization policy if more of the retarded will use the new 
community services, pushing tax bills up. Homeowners and public officials have 
particular concerns for the details of policy. Thus, homeowners frequently oppose 
group homes as neighbors (Kressel 1975; Chandler and Ross 1976 [with comments 
by Deutch 1976 and Simmons 1976]; Lippincott 1979, pp. 769-70; Mamula and 
Newman 1973, pp. 58-69), and officials who run other programs may fear a loss in 
resources, conflict with other goals, or an increase in a kind of client they cannot 
easily accommodate within their existing organizational framework.'7 
Finally, consider the heterogeneous group of people who provide services to 
the retarded. The relatively unskilled ward personnel in institutions for the re- 
tarded have overtly opposed deinstitutionalization because of the fear of losing 
their jobs (see Jones et al. [1975, chap. 4] and the discussion of Pennsylvania's 
deinstitutionalization efforts in Bradley [1978, pp. 94-98]). In contrast, profession- 
als who work with the mentally retarded have in recent years generally embraced 
deinstitutionalization and normalization efforts. They have, however, spelled out 
16. Both these propositions are illustrated by a case study of the Parents and Friends of 
Mentally Retarded Children of Bridgeport (reported in Aiken et al. 1975, p. 64). 
17. Sarason and Doris (1979, pp. 359-66) discuss the opposition of "regular" teachers to 
mainstreaming. See Weatherley and Lipsky (1978) on the difficulty of implementing the 
Massachusetts law mandating education for the handicapped. Brewer and Kakalik (1979, 
chap. 13) discuss the federal Vocational Rehabilitation Act's emphasis on speedy placement. 
As a consequence, administrators of vocational rehabilitation programs have resisted accept- 
ing the severely and moderately retarded as clients. 
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their support in a way that retains or enhances the position of their professional 
specialty. They can almost always be roughly classified as taking an equal respect 
position which holds that their own profession enhances the autonomy of the 
retarded. Thus, the Council for Exceptional Children, the professional organiza- 
tion of special education teachers, advocates mainstreaming so long as it involves 
a key role for specialized teachers for the retarded. Their policy statement (1971) 
argues for individualized instruction (p. 422), for beginning education early in life 
and ending it late (p. 421), for the use of specialized personnel (p. 432), and for 
increased professional training and supportive services (p. 423). 
The National Association of Superintendents of Public Residential Facilities 
for the Mentally Retarded supports a move to smaller institutions but argues that 
total institutions will continue to be appropriate for some people and worries 
about the problem of quality control in a decentralized system (reported in Edel- 
son [1979] and Gettings [1979]). While recognizing the current emphasis on dein- 
stitutionalization, the group believes that publicly supported residential facilities 
"will always continue to be a necessary and important part of the continuum of 
services" (Edelson 1979, p. 1). Poor conditions in institutions are not seen to be the 
result of poor programs in the institutions but are, instead, believed to be caused 
by the lack of community alternatives. 
The American Association on Mental Deficiency (AAMD), representing pro- 
fessionals who work with the mentally retarded, favors more community-based 
care so long as it is coupled with plenty of specialized professional services. Thus, 
the AAMD's statement on Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons (reprinted in 
Friedman 1976, pp. 179-86) includes: "A. The right to a publicly supported and 
administered comprehensive and integrated set of habilitative programs and ser- 
vices designed to minimize handicap or handicaps" (p. 183); "B. The right to a 
publicly supported and administered program of training and education includ- 
ing, but not restricted to, basic academic and interpersonal skills" (p. 184); "C. 
The right. . . to a publicly administered and supported program of training 
toward a goal of maximum gainful employment . . . " (p. 184). In discussing the 
right of the retarded to impartial guardians or advocates, they stress that, when 
courts appoint guardians, they should seek "competent professional advice" (p. 
186). 
State officials who control budgets for programs which aid the mentally 
retarded have supported some of the positions taken by the ARCs and the legal 
activists. Given the shift in professional opinion, they are not singlemindedly 
concerned with increasing their budgets.'8 Instead, many administrators have be- 
come genuine converts to the normalization movement, making use of the issue to 
lobby for additional federal funds with little extra federal monitoring.'9 They 
have, however, clashed with activists who hold respect-based positions over the 
importance of specialized professional care and the definition of community- 
18. This is in contrast to the position of Niskanen (1971), who hypothesizes that bureau 
heads will seek to maximize the size of the bureau's budget. 
19. In 1978, a task force at the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
(1978, annexes 2 and 3) presented a set of options to promote community-based care of the 
mentally disabled. They were advised by a working group of eight state mental health and 
mental retardation commissioners. The commissioners thought that increased Medicaid 
coverage for mental disease was a high priority and sought more social service (Title XX) 
and HUD funds for the retarded. They supported deinstitutionalization efforts but opposed 
most additional federal regulatory oversight. 
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based care. They may disagree, for example, about whether a state-run regional 
center for a hundred people counts as a community-based facility or whether it is 
necessary to establish group homes with only four or five people per house. 
V. MONEY, PRIVATE INTERESTS, AND IDEOLOGICAL PURITY 
The implementation of the normalization principle is complicated both by con- 
flicts between principles and by tensions between private interests and moral 
positions. These conflicts are reflected in the political system's response. Politi- 
cians have reacted to the political activity of advocates for the retarded by giving 
them partial victories that do little damage to the politicians' reelection chances 
(for summaries of recent legislation see PCMR [1977, pp. 157-92] and Bradley 
[1978, pp. 38-47]). First, the U.S. Congress has passed laws with strong preambles 
and small appropriations. For example, the 1978 Amendments to the Develop- 
mental Disabilities Services and Facilities Construction Act (P.L. 95-602) contains 
sweeping statements in favor of deinstitutionalization and advocacy for the re- 
tarded and others who are "developmentally disabled." At the same time, federal 
appropriations are small compared with those for other federal social service 
programs and as a proportion of spending on the retarded.20 Second, Congress has 
ordered private organizations or lower-level governments to bear the costs. Al- 
though the burden on society may ultimately be quite large, members of Congress 
have tried to immunize themselves from responsibility for this result. Thus, the 
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (P.L. 94-142) imposes most 
costs on state governments and local school districts. The law mandates that all 
handicapped children receive a free, appropriate public education by 1980 but 
provides limited funds and leaves the actual implementation to local school dis- 
tricts.2' The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 requires employers and educational insti- 
tutions which accept federal funds to accommodate the handicapped unless a 
person's problem interferes with learning or carrying out "essential" job tasks 
20. The 1978 amendments contain the claim that the law's overall purpose is "to assist 
states to assure that persons with developmental disabilities receive the care, treatment, and 
other services necessary to enable them to achieve their maximum potential through a 
system which coordinates, monitors, plans and evaluates those services and which ensures 
the protection of the legal and human rights of persons with developmental disabilities" (92 
Stat. 3004, P.L. 95-602, USC 6000, ?502, amending 101). They also contain the statement that 
"it is in the national interest to strengthen programs, especially programs that reduce or 
eliminate the need for institutional care to meet the needs of persons with developmental 
disabilities." The definition of developmental disability has shifted over time as the law was 
amended. The original 1963 act referred only to mental retardation. By 1978, the term 
"mental retardation" had been eliminated. Appropriations under the basic support section 
of the Act are a tiny fraction of the money spent by the federal government on education, 
training, employment, and social services. In Connecticut, federal developmental disability 
funds cover less than 1 percent of the operating budget of the Department of Mental Retarda- 
tion (Connecticut Department of Mental Retardation 1979a; Connecticut State Planning 
Council for Developmental Disabilities 1980). 
21. The law authorizes federal grants based on the number of handicapped children, 
three to twenty-one years old, who received special education and related services multiplied 
by a growing fraction of average per-pupil expenditures for students in the United States. 
Because grants do not cover the costs of compliance, the costs to local school districts are 
likely to be substantial (Hartman 1979). Because of this, Roach (1978, p. 719) claims that 
some states have refused to accept the federal funds. 
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(Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [29 USC ?? 701-794, 1976], as amended by P.L. 95-602, 
Titles I-IV, 92 Stat. 2955-3003) (see Olenick 1980; Bellamy et al. 1980). Once 
again, the government contractor or grantee, not the federal government, must 
bear the cost of this accommodation.22 
Faced with limited federal funds specifically for the retarded, the advocates of 
normalization have countered by working through the bureaucracy to tap open- 
ended federal social programs.23 This has led to some awkward compromises 
between ideological purity and the desire for resources. The only federal sources of 
open-ended funds are the welfare system and Medicaid. For a few brief years, 
federal money for state social services was open ended. States, however, soon 
realized that they could use this program to obtain federal matching money for a 
large proportion of their budgets. Spending burgeoned, and, in response, Con- 
gress passed Title XX of the Social Security Act, which imposed a spending limit 
(see Derthick [1975] for an analysis of this case). In response, community-based 
programs for the mentally retarded that had expanded using social service funds 
(Hammer and Howse 1977) now received stricter scrutiny at the state level and had 
to compete with other claimants for funds. With social service funds limited, this 
left welfare and Medicaid. Both present ideological problems for a person commit- 
ted to normalization. Any program which specifically lists the retarded as benefi- 
ciaries requires some kind of labeling process. Even if the program provides 
benefits in the form of medical care or extra income, these benefits are given in 
return for a label. Advocates for the retarded face a basic conflict between helping 
the retarded "pass" and helping them obtain special services. If you are not la- 
beled, you cannot receive aid for your condition. If you are labeled that, in itself, 
may make further learning and adaptation difficult (Jones et al. 1975, p. 195; 
Potter 1977). 
The problem of stigma is further exacerbated by the welfare system's defini- 
tion of the eligible retarded as people unable to care for themselves24 and by 
Medicaid's understandable insistence on providing medical care. Since the welfare 
program for the retarded is designed for people so disabled that they cannot work, 
benefits are terminated if earnings are above a federally imposed ceiling (U.S. 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 1977, p. 48). "Normalization," 
however, has been taken to imply self-sufficiency through paid work (see Bellamy 
et al. 1980; Conley 1973). Administrators of sheltered workshops may thus wish to 
pay the retarded relatively high wages as a way of improving their self-respect and 
22. When a person is retarded (or otherwise handicapped), it is not obvious what equal 
opportunity means. Since these people are frequently genuinely low-productivity workers, 
one must face the question of how much redesign of school programs and jobs or of capital 
is required to assure equal opportunity (Olenick 1980; Wikler 1979). Bellamy et al. (1980) 
and Conley (1973) argue strongly in favor of such redesign in the workplace. 
23. They have also worked through the courts. See Kindred et al. (1976) and the Stan- 
ford Law Review Symposium (1979). 
24. The federal Social Security Administration's definition of mental deficiency (re- 
corded in Kakalik et al. 1976, pp. 425-26) is: "A. Severe mental and social incapacity as 
evidenced by marked dependence upon others for personal needs (e.g. bathing, washing, 
dressing, etc.) and inability to understand the spoken word and inability to avoid physical 
danger (fire, cars, etc.) and inability to follow simple directions and inability to read, write 
and perform simple calculations; or B. IQ of 49 or less (see ? 12.00 C1); or C. IQ of 50 to 69, 
inclusive (see ? 12.00 Cl) and: 1. Inability to perform routine, repetitive tasks; or 2. A 
physical or other mental impairment resulting in restriction of function." 
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the attitudes of others toward them. Although the federal government does make 
some special allowance for employees of sheltered workshops, the ceiling implies 
that mentally retarded workers must earn very low wages in order to remain 
eligible for welfare. 
Similarly, those pushing for normalization see all the retarded as capable of 
learning and want to describe retardation not as a medical problem but as a 
developmental problem that responds to "training." Thus, those seeking to pro- 
vide services for the retarded have used Medicaid money to fund sheltered work- 
shops and day programs.25 In an attempt to please Medicaid administrators, this 
can be called "vocational therapy" rather than "job training." The use of Medi- 
caid money to provide such "therapy," however, is a currently controversial issue 
that has yet to be resolved by federal administrators.26 
Some advocates, unhappy with the tension between their principles and the 
stated purposes of the laws that provide funding, have sought to change the laws 
and their accompanying regulations. For example, instead of seeking to pass new 
specialized acts for the retarded, they have tried to push Medicaid administrators 
toward the support of deinstitutionalization without moving them away from 
their basic commitment to providing medical care. Thus advocates have support- 
ed the imposition of stringent Medicaid regulations on public institutions. The 
federal government will not provide Medicaid funds to clients unless the institu- 
tions have complied with these regulations.27 One way to comply is to reduce 
institutional populations. This can be done both by moving old residents out and 
by refusing to admit new residents. Waiting lists have increased,28 and some of the 
mentally retarded are cared for in regular nursing homes with no special pro- 
grams for the retarded.29 Thus, the drive for high-quality care in institutions and 
pressure from ARCs to get people out of institutions have combined to provide 
fewer people with public care, to push people into day programs that may not be 
suitable for them, and to keep many of the severely retarded in difficult family 
situations that are not obviously superior to institutional care. Partial "reform" 
may be worse than none at all (cf. Cameron 1978). 
25. Bellamy et al. (1980) found that fourteen states used Medicaid funds for sheltered 
workshops or other adult day programs. A survey by the author indicated that this was done 
extensively in Connecticut. 
26. Conversation with Ronald Conley, Office of Planning and Evaluation, U.S. De- 
partment of Health and Human Services, July 28, 1980. 
27. Before July 15, 1980, federal Medicaid administrators would fund patients in insti- 
tutions that met Medicaid staffing requirements but had not yet made capital improvements. 
The money for making these improvements had to be available, however. Since July 15, 
1980, no new institutions can be certified unless the improvements have actually been carried 
out (interview with Lynn Gravink, Deputy Commissioner, Connecticut Department of Men- 
tal Retardation, August 1, 1980). 
28. In Connecticut, there was an "urgent" waiting list of 270 at the end of July 1980. 
This was an increase from 154 as of June 30, 1979, and fifty-eight as of October 1, 1978 
(interview with Lynn Gravink; Connecticut Department of Mental Retardation 1979b, p. 
28). See also Nebraska Regional Director's Council 1980, pp. 112-15. 
29. The data on this practice are scanty, but it is a concern expressed by advocates for 
the retarded. Some of the people on urgent waiting lists live in nursing homes (Connecticut 
Department of Mental Retardation 1979b, p. 28; Nebraska Regional Director's Council 1980, 
pp. 113-15), and in some states people have been moved from institutions for the mentally 
retarded to nursing homes. Scheerenberger (1979, p. 15) reports that, of the 8,723 people who 
left public facilities for the mentally retarded, 6.9 percent went to nursing homes. The data 
do not indicate, however, whether most of these people were sick or very old. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The normalization movement faces the problem of all successful reforms-trans- 
lating slogans into policy. Rallying cries are a useful way to get attention, but they 
are not very helpful when one must decide how to accommodate conflict (cf. Jones 
et al. 1975, p. 190; Zigler 1978). In this paper, I have isolated four kinds of conflict. 
The first is a conflict between principles: an individual may hold internally incon- 
sistent or poorly articulated positions, or people may disagree with each other on 
which principles should guide policy. The second is a conflict between private 
interests and moral principles, and the third is the conflict between opposing 
private interests. The final conflict is an internal tension that activists face when 
their principles clash with the realities of political life. Should they hold out for 
their principles, or should they compromise in order to obtain money for services? 
Since none of these conflicts can be resolved by a simple appeal to the normal- 
ization principle, this slogan appears to have outlived its usefulness. Reformers 
should not respond to this difficulty by inventing another slogan. Instead, people 
need to think through their positions, looking for inconsistencies and trying to 
sort out private interests from moral principles. Perhaps it is too optimistic to 
imagine that the current ad hoc, disjointed method of policymaking will be helped 
by an attempt to think through the practical implications of one's philosophical 
beliefs. Nevertheless, one can at least hope to discover which claims require a 
stronger empirical basis, which depend upon basic beliefs, and which further a 
private interest. 
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